FORMBY V. BARKER
(1903) JELR 80164 (CA)
Court of Appeal
•
14 Jul 1903
•
United Kingdom
Coram
Vaughan Williams, Romer and Stirling LJJ
Appearances
Neville, KC, and FM Preston for the the plaintiff.
Astbury, KC, and Dixon McConkey for the defendant
Judgement
<p><br></p><p>VAUGHAN WILLIAM LJ (reading the lead judgment)</p><p>(stated the facts and said that as the Mutual Land Co took possession of the land by virtue of the deed of 1868, and the defendant claimed under them, the non-execution of the deed by the company only resulted in the rights thereunder being merely equitable, because there was no legal covenant, held that, on the construction of the covenant, “shop” therein meant“beer-shop,” and continued)</p><p>This view really puts an end to the plaintiff's case, but as another defence was raised and is discussed by the learned Vice-Chancellor, I think it right to deal with that point also. The learned Vice-Chancellor expressed his opinion that, even if the plaintiff's construction of the covenant was right, and there had been a breach of the covenant, nevertheless the plaintiff was not entitled to sue – that is to say, was not entitled to sue either as personal representative of Roger Formby, or as residuary devisee under the will of Roger Formby. I agree with the conclusions of the Vice-Chancellor as to there being nothing in the point made by the defendant on the non-execution of the conveyance by the company, other than this, that there is no legal covenant. I have no doubt but that the Mutual Land Co took the estate conveyed subject to the condition contained in the covenant, and I have no doubt but that Formby during his life could have enforced that condition, and I am inclined to think even by an action for damages. I wish before dealing with the question of the plaintiff's right to sue, to point out that that which Roger Formby conveyed was his whole estate, and that he had no contiguous estate which would be benefited by the covenant in question. I wish, further, to point out that there is in the deed no re-entry clause under which the vendor could go in as of his old estate or, indeed, as of any estate.</p><p>In my judgment, this covenant is a personal covenant, but I do not think that, having regard to the opinions of the judges delivered in the House of Lords in Beckham v. Drake (2) the right of action which, in my judgment, would have vested in Roger Formby on a breach in his lifetime is of such a character that a breach after his death would not give a right of action to his personal representative against the covenantors, the Mutual Land Co The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has no application to any breaches of contract except those which constitute a mere personal wrong, and with the exception of actions for breaches which constitute a mere personal wrong all rights of action for breaches of contract pass to the executors. In an action for breach of covenant or condition, proof of damage is not essential, and, in my judgment there has been, if the plaintiff's construction of the covenant is right, a plain breach in this case of a covenant, which breach is not a mere personal wrong.</p><p>I make these observations to dispose of the argument addressed on the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, but this still leaves the difficulty that the defendant is not a party to the deed, and that there is plainly no covenant running with land on which the defendant could be sued at law. It becomes necessary, therefore, to see if an action for an injunction can be brought upon the principle established by the judgment of LORD COTTENHAM, LC, in Tulk v. Moxhay (1). In the marginal note in that case it is said (2 Ph at p 774):</p><p>“A covenant between vendor and purchaser, on the sale of land, that the purchaser and his assigns shall use or abstain from using the land in a particular way, will be enforced in equity against all subsequent purchasers with notice, independently of the question whether it be one which runs with the land so as to be binding upon subsequent purchasers at law.”</p><p>But when the Lord Chancellor begins his judgment he says (2 Ph at p 777):</p><p>“That this court has jurisdiction to enforce a contract between the owner of land and his neighbour purchasing a part of it, that the latter shall either use or abstain from using the land purchased in a particular way, is what I never knew disputed.”</p><p>These words do not cover the present case, because the land company did not purchase a part of the vendor's land, but the whole of it.</p><p>It becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain whether the principle of Tulk v. Moxhay (1) applies to a case where the vendor sells his whole estate. I have not been able to find any case in which after the sale of the whole of an estate in land,the benefit of a restrictive covenant has been enforced by injunction against an assignee of the purchaser at the instance of a plaintiff having no land retained by the vendor, although there are cases in which restrictive covenants seem to have been enforced at the instance of plaintiffs other than the vendor for the benefit of whose land it appears from the terms of the covenant, or can be inferred from surrounding circumstances, the covenant was intended to operate. In all other cases the restrictive covenant would seem to be a mere personal covenant collateral to the conveyance. It is a covenant which cannot run with the land either at law or in equity, and, therefore, the burden of the covenant cannot be enforced against an assignee of the purchaser. But it is said that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay (1) is independent of the question whether there is in law or in equity a covenant running with the land, and that the doctrine is based upon an obligation on the conscience of persons taking an estate with notice of a restrictive covenant binding it. The answer, I think, is to be found in a passage in the judgment of HENN COLLINS, LJ, in Rogers v. Hosegood (3). He says ([1900] 2 Ch at p 407):</p><p>“These authorities establish the proposition that, when the benefit has been once clearly annexed to one piece of land, it passes by assignment of that land, and may be said to run with it in contemplation as well of equity as of law without proof of special bargain or representation on the assignment.”</p><p>In such a case it runs, not because the conscience of either party is affected, but because the purchaser has bought something which inhered in or was annexed to the land bought. This is the reason why in dealing with the burden the purchaser's conscience is not affected by notice of covenants which were part of the original bargain on the first sale, but were merely personal and collateral, while it is affected by notice of those which touch and concern the land. The covenant must be one that is capable of running with the land before the question of the purchaser's conscience and the equity affecting it can come into discussion.</p><p>It seems to me that in the passage I have just cited HENN COLLINS, LJ, assumes that the doctrine of Talk v. Moxhay (1) will not apply to a contract which is merely personal and collateral. In my judgment, the covenant in the present case is merely personal and collateral; it has not been entered into for the benefit of any land of the vendor or of any land designated in the conveyance; it is a covenant which, in my judgment, would not pass to the heirs of the vendor, notwithstanding the words of the covenant are “covenant with the said Roger Hesketh Formby, his heirs, executors, and administrators.” There is no land designated to which the word “heirs” can be applied. Roger Formby could have sued the purchasers for breaches in his lifetime, and I think that his administratrix could have sued the purchasers for breaches after the death of Roger Formby, but I do not think that the administratrix can sue the assignee of the purchasers. There is no contractual privity and no relation of dominancy and serviency of lands which will enable an action to be brought against a person not a party to the original contract, nor do I think that the benefit of the covenant could be dealt with by a devise. In his judgment in London and South-western Rail Co v. Gomm (4) SIR GEORGE JESSEL says (20 Ch D at p 583):</p><p>“The doctrine of that case, [Tulk v. Moxhay (1)] rightly considered, appears to me to be either an extension in equity of the doctrine of Spencer's Case (5) to another line of cases, or else an extension in equity of the doctrine of negative easements, such, for instance, as a right to the access of light which prevents the owner of the servient tenement from building so as to obstruct the light. ... This is an equitable doctrine establishing an exception to the rules of common law which did not treat such a covenant as running with the land, and it does not matter whether it proceeds on analogy to a covenant running with the land or on analogy to an easement.”</p><p>I think that in both these paragraphs SIR GEORGE JESSEL, whether describing the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay (1) as an extension of Spencer's Case (5) or of the equitable doctrine of negative easements, regards it as something arising from the relation of two estates one to the other.</p><p>I have only to add that I do not think that either the passage in the judgment of KNIGHT BRUCE, LJ, in De Mattos v. Gibson (6) nor the statement of the law by LORD CAIRNS in Doherty v. Allman (7) in any way militate against the conclusion at which I have arrived, that where a negative or restrictive covenant is imposed upon user of land it will not be enforced against an owner not a party to the deed containing the covenant, if such covenant is merely personal and collateral to a conveyance of land. If it is said that the statement of KNIGHT BRUCE, LJ, in De Mattos v. Gibson (6) which runs thus (4 De G and J at p 282):</p><p>“Reason and justice seem to prescribe that, at least as a general rule, where a man, by gift or purchase, acquires property from another, with knowledge of a previous contract, lawfully and for valuable consideration made by him with a third person, to use and employ the property for a particular purpose in a Specified manner, the acquirer shall not to the material damage of the third person in opposition to the contract, and inconsistently with it, use and employ the property in a manner not allowable to the giver or seller. This rule, applicable dike in general, as I conceive, to movable and unmovable property, and recognised and adopted, as I apprehend, by the English law, may, like other general rules, be liable to exceptions arising from special circumstances; but I see at present no room for any exception in the instance before us”</p><p>negatives the above conclusion, because it shows that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay (1) applies to personal as well as real property, I answer, first, that the basis of the statement by KNIGHT BRUCE, LJ, is rather the principle of Lumley v. Wagner (8) than that of Tulk v. Moxhay (1); and, secondly, that it is plain that the lord justice would not have thought that an injunction ought to have been granted if the plaintiff had assigned the charterparty, nor unless the plaintiff has sustained material damage. And as to what LORD CAIRNS says in Doherty v. Allman (7) it only shows that proof of damage is not necessary for the granting of an injunction in a Case in which the parties to a contract for valuable consideration with their eyes open contract that a particular thing shall not be done. I think, for the reasons which I have given, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor was right on both points, and I think this appeal should be dismissed with costs.</p><p>ROMER LJ:</p><p>I agree with the lord justice that we ought not in this case to differ from the view taken by the Vice- Chancellor as to the true construction of the covenant in question. I also agree in thinking that in this case, even if there had been a breach of the covenant, the administratrix of the covenantee is not entitled to an injunction. If restrictive covenants are entered into with a covenantee, not in respect of or concerning any ascertainable property belonging to the covenantee or in which he is interested, then the covenant must be regarded, So far as he is concerned, as a personal covenant, that is to say, as one obtained by him for Some personal purpose or object. It appears to me that it is not legally permissible for him to assign the benefit of such a covenant to any person or persons he may choose, so as to place the assign or assigns in his position, with power again for them to assign, and so on indefinitely. Clearly at law such a right or power of assigning does not exist, and in equity up to the present time no such right has been recognised. To admit a right to obtain an injunction in such a case in any assign would be to extend the principle recognised in Tulk v. Moxhay (1) far beyond what is, in my opinion, justifiable. For the purposes of the present case, the administratrix can only be regarded and can only be entitled (if at all) to any relief in the capacity of so assign of the covenant, for the alleged breach of the covenant relied on took place after the death of the covenantee. I think, therefore, that on this ground also the appeal fails.</p><p>STIRLING LJ:</p><p>By a deed of 27 July 1868, Roger Hesketh Formby, upon a sale by him of certain real estate, conveyed that estate to the purchaser subject to restrictive covenants expressed to be entered into by the purchaser with him, his heirs, executors, and administrators. At the date of this deed Roger Hesketh Formby was not entitled to any land, freehold, copyhold, or leasehold, other than that which was thereby conveyed. Consequently, he was not at that date, nor (if it be material) did he subsequently become, entitled to any land for the protection or benefit of which the restrictive covenants were or could be intended. The plaintiff is his administratrix and universal legatee. In point of fact the deed of 1868 was not executed by the purchaser, and consequently there was no covenant as between vendor and purchaser which could be enforced at law; but with reference to the question whether the obligation intended to be imposed on the purchaser can be enforced in equity, this is immaterial, for the plaintiff cannot be in a better position than if such covenant bad, in fact, existed, and it seems to me desirable to consider what the rights of the plaintiff would have been in that case. She might then have brought an action at law, but I have difficulty in seeing that she could have recovered more than nominal damages. However, if substantial damages could be recovered, it would seem to be the duty of the administratrix to resort to that remedy, for thus only could the personal estate, which it is her duty to protect, be benefited. I think that in the absence of special circumstances not found in the present case, damages would not only be an adequate but the most appropriate remedy. This being so, I do not think that a court of equity ought to interfere in her favour by way of injunction. If it did, I do not see why the like relief should be denied to any duly constituted legal personal representative of Roger Hesketh Formby at any time, however remote, assuming always that matters remained as they were at the date of his death. This seems to me to amount to a reductio ad absurdum of the plaintiff's claim. To avoid misconception I wish to add that different considerations would apply if the action had been brought by Roger Hesketh Formby in his lifetime.</p><p>Appeal dismissed.</p>