G. B. OLLIVANT, LTD V. KWESI BAA KORSAH
JELR 80524 (WACA)
West Africa Court of Appeal
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West Africa [For WACA cases]
Coram
COR. KINGDON AND PETRIDES, C.JJ., AND MâCARTHY, J.
Appearances
K. A. Bossman for Appellant. C. C. Carter for Respondents,
Judgement
<p> KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST. AND MâCARTHY J .</p><p>G. B. Ollivant, Limited, the plaintiffs-judgment-creditors- respondents, having obtained judgment in this suit against Kwesi Baa Korsah, the defendant-judgment-debtor, proceeded to attach under a Writ of Fi. Fa. an area of land at Winneba which they believed to be the property of the defendant-judgment-debtor, and to cause the land to be advertised for sale by the Deputy Sheriff whereupon Kwamina Amuaku Hayford caused to issue an Interpleader Summon whereby the plaintifts-judgment-creditors- respondents were called upon to show cause why the property seized in the suit should not be declared and adjudged to be his property and delivered to him accordingly. The matter was tried before Fuad, J., in the Divisional Court at Cape Coast. He found âthat the immovable property, subject matter of these proceedings, was in the possession of the judgment-debtor as his own propertyâ and dismissed the claimant-appellantâs application with costs. Against that dismissal the claimant-appellant appeals to this Court. There are several unsatisfactory features about the proceedings. </p><p>In the first place from the wording of the title to the suit âKwamina Amuaku Hayford-Claimantâ it seems that the claimant is claiming in his personal capacity only. This is borne rout both by the wording of the summons âshould not be declared â and adjudged to be the property of Kwamina Amuaku Hayford âthe above-named claimant thereof, and delivered to him âaccordinglyâ, and by his counselâs opening in the Court below âThe remainder of the land passed to the claimant under the âterms of a Will (probate of which was given to him) and now âbelongs to him,â On the other hand the claimant-appellant in his affidavit in support of his application for the interpleader summons swore:- </p><p>â1. That I am the claimant herein for myself and other âbeneficiaries under the Will of the late R. M. Korsah whose consent âI have. â8. That I make this Affidavit for myself and on behalf of the âother beneficiaries in support of application for an interpleader âsummons to issue and for stay of execution pending the hearing and âdetermination of same.â </p><p>This is the only formal intimation that the âother beneficiariesâ were parties to the suit, and the learned trial Judge remarked in his judgment that they were conspicuous by their absence. The question of whether in fact they are or are</p><p><sup class='page-numbering' title='Page 190'>*Page 190</sup> </p><p>not parties to the suit is left in the air. Moreover the very identity of the other beneficiaries is left vague. the claimant said in evidenceâ the beneficiaries are ten; six nephews and four ânieces. Some of the beneficiaries are now dead. My aunt is still alive.â He does not give any names or say which, or indeed how many, are dead, But. colour is lent to the above-quoted clauses of claimant-appellantâs affidavit when we turn to the Will mentioned in his counselâs opening Claimant-appellant relies upon the terms of clause of the Will which are:- </p><p>â5. After all expenses in connection with my son Kobina Arku âKorsahâs profession are paid, I give and bequeath unto my sisters âand their children the residue of my real and personal estate.â </p><p>Claimant-appellant is one of the children and it is obvious that any claim under that clause can only be as one of the beneficiaries, and that the- claimant-appellant cannot found upon the clause a claim that the whole area should be adjudged his property. Counsel for the claimant-appellant does not pretend to make such a claim; his contention throughout has been on behalf of the claimant-appellant as a beneficiary claiming on behalf of himself and his co-beneficiaries, If this is so it is in flagrant it violation of Rule 1 of Order 3 of the third Schedule to the Courts Ordinance (Chapter 4), the relevant part of which reads:- </p><p>âIf the plaintiff sues or any defendant is sued in any ârepresentative capacity, it shall be expressed in the writ.â Even in this Court there has been no application to amend the form of the claim. The second unsatisfactory feature of the proceedings relates to the description of the parcel of land in dispute. The interpleader summons describes it as âcertain property consisting of âall that piece or parcel of land measuring 300 x- 220 x 396 â x 200 feet, bounded on the north by New Street, on the south âby William Edward Richardsonâs land, east by New Street and âwest by Alexander Road,â This is in accordance with the description of the property attached given in paragraph 3 of the claimant-appellantâs affidavit, but in paragraph 2 of the same affidavit he sets out what has been advertised for sale as âall âright title and interest of the judgment-debtor all that piece or âparcel of land with buildings thereon situate lying and being âat Winneba in the Central Province of the Gold Coast and âbounded on or towards the north by a street on or towards the âsouth by Quainoo and Micahâs land on or towards the east by a âstreet and or towards the west by Victoria Street.â On the face of it the two descriptions might be about two entirely different pieces of land, but they are supposed to refer to the same land. Counsel has told us that Alexander Road and Victoria Street are one and the same, but this only seems to make confound worse confounded. Nor are matters helped when we turn to the plan attached to Exhibit 1 which figures so importantly in the case, </p><p><sup class='page-numbering' title='Page 191'>*Page 191</sup> </p><p>for this shows Quainoo and Micahâs land as north of the area in dispute, not south of it as set out in the above-quoted paragraph 3 of the claimant-appellantâs affidavit. However, the parties do seem agreed about the area of land as to which they are actually disputing. It is common ground that there is an area of land Korsah which was in the possession of the judgment-debtor and surrounded by a wall erected by him; within this area is a smaller area of 120 feet square marked out by pillars, and within that smaller area stands the judgment-debtorâs substantial house. There is no dispute as to the smaller area of 120 feet square containing the house. The claimant-appellant admits that this is the judgment-debtorâs property and makes no claim to it. The dispute is as to the area within the wall surrounding the smaller area marked out by pillars. This is included in the area attached and the claimant-appellant whilst admitting that the judgment- debtor was in possession of it, claims that it is the property of himself and his co-beneficiaries. A third point as to which the proceedings were unsatisfactory is that the copy of the Will of Robert Marmaduke Korsah put in evidence by consent at the outset of the case is not even a probate copy. Counsel for the claimant-appellant had stated in his opening that probate of the Will was given to the claimant and this was not traversed, but there was no evidence of probate before the Court. This is not the proper way to prove the contents of a Will. Briefly the facts of the case are that the whole area of land now enclosed within a wall built round it by the judgment-debtor, Kwesi Baa Korsah, originally belonged to his father, Robert Marmaduke Korsah. (For convenience this whole area may be called âthe larger area.â) Robert Marmaduke allowed his son Kwesi Baa to build a house upon this area. The house was completed in 1928. On the 4th May, 1929, Robert Marmaduke executed a deed of gift in favour of Kwesi Baa whereby he gave, granted and conveyed to Kwesi Baa his executors administrators and assignsâ All that piece or parcel of land situate lying and âbeing at Winneba in the Province and Colony aforesaid and âbounded on the north by Quainoo and Micahâs land measuring âone hundred and twenty feet (120) more or less on the south âby Proposed Street measuring one hundred and twenty feet â(120) more or less on the east by Proposed Street measuring âone hundred and twenty feet (120) more or less and on the âwest by Victoria Road and measuring one hundred and twenty âfeet (120) more or less which said piece or parcel of land is âmore particularly delineated in the plan drawn herein.â </p><p>The plan referred to is merely a square of 120 feet showing Quainoo and Micahâs and on the north, Victoria Road on the west and proposed streets on the south and east. </p><p><sup class='page-numbering' title='Page 192'>*Page 192</sup> </p><p>As pointed out by respondentâs counsel this document contains a latent ambiguity, the description of the land being, upon examination, irreconcilable with the plan. It was obviously donorâs intention to give his son the land on which he had built a house with an area surrounding it, but it is admitted that 120 feet measured from Victoria Road on the west would not include the house, nor would it reach as far as Quainoo and Micahâs land. It is largely upon how this ambiguity is to be resolved that this case turns. The respondents contend that the measurements must be ignored and that the deed must be interpreted as giving to Kwesi Baa the whole of the larger area, the boundaries of which coincide with the description in the deed. The appellant on the other hand contends that the was to give to Kwesi Baa an area of only 120 feet square within the larger area and including the house. The area for which he contends may conveniently be called âthe smaller area.â It is now enclosed by pillars which the learned trial Judge found were erected in 1941. </p><p>Robert Marmaduke Korsah died some six months after executing this deed of gift. He left a Will made in 1915, clause 5 of which reads as follows:- â5. After all expenses in connection with my son âKobina Arku Korsahâs profession are paid, I give and âbequeath unto my sisters and their children the residue of âmy real and personal estate.â </p><p>If the appellantâs contention that it was only the smaller area that passed to Kwesi Baa is correct then the balance of the larger area would form part of the residuary estate of the deceased and pass under clause 5 of the Will to the beneficiaries of whom the appellant is one. </p><p>After Robert Marmadukeâs death, Kwesi Baa built a wall round the whole of the larger area and performed a number of other acts which the respondents contend showed his ownership of all the larger area. He erected other substantial buildings upon the larger area but outside the smaller area and dealt with them as owner by leasing or mortgaging them. Inter alia he mortgaged one such building to the respondents themselves and this mortgage was still subsisting at the time of the attachment of the property, the respondents electing (as they were entitled to do) to proceed against the whole property by writ of Fi. Fa. rather than to rely upon the mortgaged property only to satisfy their claim. </p><p>The appellantâs claim is preferred under Order 44 Rule 25 (1) of Schedule 3 to the Courts Ordinance, the material part of which reads as follows: - </p><p>âIn the event of any claim being preferred to, or âobjection offered against, the sale of lands, or any other âimmovable or movable property which may have been</p><p><sup class='page-numbering' title='Page 193'>*Page 193</sup> </p><p>âattached in execution of a decree, or under any order of âattachment made before judgment, as not liable to be sold âin execution of a decree against the judgment debtor, the âCourt shall, subject to the proviso contained in the next âsucceeding rule, proceed to investigate the same with âthe like powers as if the claimant had been originally âmade a party to the suit, and if it shall appear âto the satisfaction of the Court that the land or other âinmovable or movable property was not in the possession âof the party against whom execution is sought, or of some âperson in trust for him, or in the occupancy of persons âpaying rent to him at the time when the property was âattached, or that, being in possession of the party himself âat such time, it was so in his possession not on his own âaccount, or as his own property, but on account of, âor in trust for some other person, the Court shall make an âorder releasing the said property from attachment.â </p><p>Since it is admitted that at the time of attachment the whole of the larger area was in the possession of the judgment-debtor, the rule clearly places upon the claimant the onus of making it appear to the Court that the debtorâs possession was, as the claimant contends, on account of, or in trust for the claimant and his co-beneficiaries under the Will of Robert Marmaduke Korsah. So far from the claimant-appellant having discharged this onus in the Court below, the learned trial Judge found definitely that the property was in the possession of the judgment- debtor as his own property. The learned trial Judge delivered an oral judgment and recorded the following brief notes from it:- âI do not believe evidence of claimant (one of the , âbeneficiaries--others conspicuous by their absence) and of the âjudgment-debtor, that land was measured and given to âjudgment-debtor. Treatment of land by all parties; the âerection, by the judgment-debtor, of a mansion in the âmiddle of it without any passage âleading to it through âthe land; the enclosing of the whole of the land by a wall âbuilt to match the building; the putting up, by the âjudgment-debtor, of other buildings on the land, and âexercising rights of ownership over them, such as leasing âthem and mortgaging them, etc., show that the whole land âwas given to judgment-debtor. Even if measured, it can- ânot now be identified; if any ambiguity in deed, then âboundaries must be looked at. Even if whole land not , âintended, all are estopped now from stating that only a âportion was given. Erection of pillars in 1941 with the âinitials of the donor, who has been dead for so many years, âand isolating the building, a fraud and an after-thought. âI donât believe that any pillars existed before 1941. </p><p><sup class='page-numbering' title='Page 194'>*Page 194</sup> </p><p>âI find that the immovable property, subject matter of âthese proceedings, was in the possession of the judgment- âdebtor as his own property. âApplication dismissed with costs-.ÂŁ2 2s counselâs fee or âplus out-of-pocket expenses to be approved by the Court âlater.â </p><p>In substance the appeal is against the finding of fact as to the debtor possessing as his own property, the claimant-appellant asking us to hold that the correct interpretation of the deed-of gift is that it passed only the smaller area to Kwesi Baa, and that the remainder of the larger area passed to the beneficiaries under Robert Marmadukeâs Will and is still their property, Kwesi Baa being in possession in trust for them. </p><p>We think that there is a latent ambiguity in the deed of gift and that the best way to resolve that ambiguity is to look to the conduct of the parties even after the death of the donor. Kwesi Baa treated the whole of the larger area as his own and the claimant and his co-beneficiaries acquiesced in his so doing up to the time that the present claim was made. As to why they did so we venture no opinion. But, as we have already said, the onus of proof was upon the claimant-appellant and we are quite unable on the evidence to come to the conclusion that the decision of the Court below was wrong. </p><p>There is, however, one part of the learned trial Judgeâs notes from his judgment to which we cannot subscribe. We refer to the sentence â Even if whole land not intended, all are estopped ânow from stating that only a portion was given.â It is a cardinal rule that if a party relies upon estoppel he must plead it. Although there were no pleadings in this case, there were openings by counsel and they take the place of pleadings. Counsel for the respondents, in his opening, did not mention estoppel and though in his final address he quoted cases of estoppel, this was not, in our opinion, sufficient to create a plea which required to be answered, and it was not competent to the learned trial Judge to find that the claimant was estopped by conduct from preferring his claim. Apart from this, even if estoppel had been pleaded we do not agree that the claimantâs conduct was such as to create an estoppel against him. We think that the highest at which it can be put is that the claimantâs conduct was such that on Court would be likely to uphold his present contention t which is wholly inconsistent with it. But estoppel is only, as it were, the second string to the bow, the first string, namely, the finding of fact that the property was in the possession of the judgment debtor as his own property, remains unimpeached. </p><p>The appeal is dismissed with costs assessed at ÂŁ29 Is 0d.</p>