judy.legal
Login Register
📄 PDF

GANIYU ADISA MOTAYO V. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

JELR 83784 (WACA)

West Africa Court of Appeal  •   •  West Africa [For WACA cases]

Coram
VERITY, C.J. (NIGERIA), RHODES AND BAIRAMIAN, J.J.

Appearances
J E. C. Dabid for Appellant. Lloyd, Crown Counsel, for Respondent.

Judgement
<p>Verity, C.J. In this case Hubbard, J., on the hearing of an appeal from conviction in a Magistrate's Court ordered the appellant to be re-tried by the Magistrate's Court, a Court of competent jurisdiction.</p><p>The power to order an appellant to be re-tritod is conferred by section 43 of the Magistrate's Courts (Appeals) Ordinance (Chapter 123). It is argued on behalf of the appellant, however, that to order a re-trial in the present case, when there is no question of the original trial being a nullity, is contrary to the common law principle that no man should be tried twice for the same offence, and Counsel referred to section 12 (5) of the West African Court of Appeals Ordinance (Chapter 229) and to the general principle of the common law as set out by Lord Finlay in R. v. Crane (1).</p><p>It is clear that at Common Law no man may be re-tried for the same offence, and that this principle is in no way infringed either by the West African Court of Appeal Ordinance nor by the practice of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England, both of which go no further than to secure that where the original proceedings were a nullity the Court may order the appellant to be tried. There is in those circumstances no question of a re-trial, for there has been in law no previous trial.</p><p>The provisions of section 43 of the Magistrate's Courts (Appeals) Ordinance, however, refer to an order for the appellant to be re-tried, clearly recognising the fact that he has already been tried but, nevertheless, empowering the judge to order a second trial.</p><p>In our view the legislature clearly intended that in such cases the Common Law principle should be disregarded and a second trial be permitted, should the judge in his discretion so order. No grounds have been put forward to show that the learned judge in this case erred in the exercise of this discretion, and even though anyone of us might not have exercised his discretion in the same way had he been hearing the original appeal; we see no reason to interfere with the judge's exercise thereof, nor any reason to say that he exercised it wrongly.</p><p>The appeal is therefore dismissed and the order for re-trial will stand.</p>

There's more. Sign in to continue reading

judy.legal is the comprehensive database of case law and legislation from Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. Gain seamless access to over 20,000 cases, recent judgments, statutes, and rules of court.


Get started   Login