JOSEPH OGUNBAYODE OGUNDIPE AND OTHERS V. THE QUEEN

Foster-Sutton, P. The appellants were charged with the murder, on or about third day of January, 1953, of one Bisiriyu Apalara.

^{*Page 460} The case came for trial before de Comarmond, S.P.J., and a jury. The hearing of the case took approximately five weeks, at the end of which the jury brought in an unanimous verdict of guilty against each of the appellants.

At the hearing of this appeal Mr. Alli Balogun appeared for the first appellant, Mr. A. Tejuoso for the third, seventh, eighth and eleventh appellants, Mr. G. B. A. Coker for the second, fourth and ninth appellants, and Mr. Tejuoso, leading Mr. Coker, for the fifth and sixth appellants, the tenth appellant argued his own case and the Crown was represented by Mr. Madarikan.

In the record of tile proceedings before the Court below the appellants, in the order in which they appear on the appeal record, are referred to as accused No.1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19 and 20, respectively.

Leave (? -was sought) to amend the grounds of appeal filed by the appellants who were represented by counsel (? who) intimated that the amended grounds of appeal were intended as a substitution for the original ones filed.

Although the ground of appeal, as filed, was somewhat differently worded, each appellant relied upon the ground that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

We have examined the evidence against each appellant with anxious care and are satisfied that there was evidence against each one of them upon which the jury could properly come to the conclusion they did. The evidence, in each case, was carefully and fairly dealt with by the learned trial Judge in his summing-up to the jury who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and there is, in our view, nothing which would justify our interfering with the verdict of the jury, in anyone of the cases, on the ground of appeal in question.

It was also submitted by counsel that the learned trial Judge failed to direct the jury properly as to the nature of evidence required in the absence of the coypus delicti and they referred to isolated passages in the summing-up in support of this contention.

We are unable to agree with this submission. It appears to us that there was ample evidence, if accepted by the jury as it clearly was, that Apalara died on the night of the 3rd January, 1953, as a result of injuries inflicted upon him, and we are of the opinion that this aspect of the matter was clearly and adequately put to the jury by the trial Judge when he summed up the case to them.

Failure adequately to direct the jury where witnesses for the prosecution had contradicted themselves was also urged as a reason for quashing the convictions, a complaint which, in the light of the careful directions given by the learned trial : Judge to the jury on the point, is, in our view, ill-founded.

Counsel also argued that the trial Judge erred in leaving the question whether the seventh witness called by the prosecution, Yesufu Aka, was an accomplice, to the jury, and submitted that the convictions of appellants 5, 6, 8 and 9, accused Nos. 6, 10, 15 and 18, respectively, ought not to be upheld because the only evidence against them was that of Yesufu Aka, who, they submitted, was clearly an accomplice, and in the absence of corroboration of his evidence the jury ought not to have convicted.

On the first point we invited counsel to refer us to authority for their proposition and they were unable to do so, no doubt for the good reason that the question whether a witness for the prosecution is an accomplice, or ought to be regarded as such, is a question of fact for the jury to determine, and the-learned trial Judge properly, we think, left it to them to decide; on the second point, we are of the opinion that the trial Judge's directions to the jury as to the danger of convicting an accused person on the uncorroborated ev1dence of an accomplice, were in accordance with the law and practice on the subject. It follows, that, in our view, there is no substance in the complaint.

Mr. Coker also submitted that the learned trial Judge “did not direct the jury properly on the possibility of returning a verdict of manslaughter “, and that it was his duty to do so even if the defence had not raised the point, and he complained of passages in the summing-up to be found at pages 310 and 410 of he record. In this connection we think it only necessary to say that the learned trial Judge put the position to the jury as favourably as the evidence justified its being put, and that if they had found a verdict of manslaughter it would have been in the face of the evidence.

The tenth appellant, accused No. 19, in substance, repeated the evidence he gave in the Court below, and denied that the statement he was alleged to have given to the police, exhibit “C1”, was a voluntary one. He denied attending he meeting held at the Bale's house on the 2nd January, 1953, or being at the scene of the crime on the night of the 3rd January, 1953. His statement “ C1” places him at the scene on the night of the 3rd January, 1953, and there was ample evidence, obviously accepted by the jury, showing his complicity in the crime.

For these reasons we are of the opinion that there is no substance in any of the appeals and they are, therefore, dismissed.

Appeals dismissed.