<p>Coussey, J. On the 21st of March, 1949 the plaintiff obtained an order in the Divisional Court against the defendant as caveator for Letters of Administration of the personal property of the deceased Kwaku Sampaney alias Kwasi Brafo. On the 30th September, 1949, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant claiming as Administrator of and as Successor by native customary law of the deceased, recovery of possession of certain chattels amongst which are an Albion lorry a single barrel gun, promissory notes and documents of sundry debtors and also the documents of title in respect of a house in Kumasi.</p><p>The defendant disputed the plaintiff's claim to recover these articles and thereby put in issue the plaintiff's right to the property both as administrator and as successor of the deceased. The plaintiff having been declared administrator the defendant could not have contested the suit on that score. But the plaintiff claimed also, possession of the articles as successor by native customary law and the Court on the authority of the Privy Council decision in Hagan v. Adum (1) stopped the further progress of the action in view of the provision of section 35 of the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance (Cap. 80) and the first schedule to that Ordinance which gives to Native Courts of Grade “B” jurisdiction in “suits and matters relating to the succession of property of any deceased” and referred the parties to the appropriate Court.</p><p>On this appeal Mr. Siriboe for the plaintiff-appellant has argued with considerable force that as the plaintiff had already succeeded in establishing his right to a grant of Letters to administer the personal property of the deceased it must be assumed that he is the successor of the deceased and that there was no issue as to succession which could properly be referred to the Native Court. There have however been many decisions of this Court and Divisional Courts that the grant of Letters of Administration of personal property of a deceased person leaves open for decision the issue as to who is the successor of the deceased by native customary law, for the simple reason that a grant in respect of personal property is made to that person usually amongst the next-of-kin who the Court considers the most suitable to administer the personal estate. That person may be the successor but he is not necessarily the successor and a grant of Letters of the personal estate does not preclude another person from establishing in other proceedings that he is in fact the successor by native customary law of the deceased. There are many instances where that issue has been decided after the grant of Letters of the personal estate.</p><p>Mr. Siriboe has further submitted that since this appeal was lodged the parties have litigated over the house and that the plaintiff was successful as against the defendant and he asks therefore that this Court may direct the Divisional Court to proceed with the suit on the basis that the only matter now for adjudication is the right of the plaintiff as administrator to call in from the defendant the personal property for distribution. He argues that the Divisional Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Native Court by virtue of section 14 of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4) and that the Divisional Court should therefore exercise jurisdiction and not refer the matter to the Native Court.</p><p>That argument in my opinion overlooks firstly the claim of the plaintiff and g secondly the plain direction of section 17 of the Courts Ordinance. As to the claim it will be noticed that the plaintiff claims not only as administrator but as successor by native customary law of the deceased. He therefore assumes the burden to establish, as a condition to succeeding on his claim, that he is the successor by native customary law. Section 17 of the Courts Ordinance provides that notwithstanding that the Court has jurisdiction it shall not exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in Ashanti in a civil cause or matter subject to the provision of section 35 of the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance (Cap. 80) and when that Ordinance is looked at it is seen that suits relating to succession to property of a deceased native are within the jurisdiction of the Native Court.</p><p>the It follows, that although the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in the suit by virtue of section 14 of the Courts Ordinance it will not exercise that jurisdiction because of section 17 of the Ordinance.</p><p>In my view the learned Judge was right in referring the parties to the Native Court and I consider the case of Ababio v. Ackumpong (2) applicable to the case as well as Hagan v. Adum (1). For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal without costs as the respondent has not appeared.</p><p>Foster-Sutton. P. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. In my opinion the learned trial Judge was right in remitting the case to the Native Court “B”. The plaintiff-appellant claimed, in his Writ of Summons, as Administrator and successor thereby putting in issue the question of succession to the property set out in the schedule to his claim. </p><p>As has been pointed out, although the Divisional Court has jurisdiction in a case such as this, it is exercising precluded from exercising it by the provisions of section 17 of Chapter 4. </p><p>M Manyo-Plange, J. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed and have nothing to add. </p><p>Appeal dismissed.</p>