<p>Harragin, C.J. In this case the plaintiff who is the Comptroller of Customs claimed against the two defendants in the following writ:-</p><p>“Between the 24th day of October, 1945 and the 29th day of October, 1945, 103 bales and 6 cases of cotton and silk goods were brought to the premises of S. E. Sassine, Transport Owner at Accra, by the first and second defendants for the purpose of the said goods being exported without a licence, contrary to the terms of the Export (Restriction) Order, 1940, made pursuant to the provisions of section 3 (1) of the Import, Export, and Customs Powers (Defence) Ordinance, 1939 (and by reason of the premises, the said goods were at all material times prohibited goods within the meaning of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance). </p><p>And the plaintiff claims:- “(1) from the first defendant the forfeiture of the said goods and a penalty of £500 by virtue of section 5 (1) of the Import, Export, and Customs Powers (Defence) Ordinance, 1939;</p><p>“(2) from the second defendant a penalty of £500 by virtue of section 5 (1) of the Import, Export, and Customs Powers (Defence) Ordinance, 1939.”</p><p>The case was heard before the learned trial Magistrate at Accra who found all the relevant facts against the defendants-appellants but disallowed the claim on a point of law.</p><p>The plaintiff-respondent thereupon appealed to the Divisional Court against the interpretation of law, whilst the defendants-appellants requested the Court to reverse the learned trial Magistrate’s findings of fact, in the event the Divisional Court reversed the trial Court's interpretation of the law but upheld its findings of fact, and it is against this decision that the appeal comes before us.</p><p>It is difficult to imagine a more optimistic appeal. In the first place;, the point of law decided by the Divisional Court has not even been argued as the point was decided by this Court in the cases of Comptroller of Customs v. C. J. Chahin and Malam Seedi and Comptroller of Customs v. F. A. Simon and Malam Seedi (Consolidated) (1) and by the Privy Council in Attorney-General v. Fakhry Ayyas (2) which only leaves for argument questions of fact which have already been decided against the appellants in two Courts.</p><p>It is not our intention to set out all the facts in this case as they are already dealt with at length in the two former judgments, and in particular in the judgment of the learned trial Magistrate. We will, however, observe that ex abundante cautela the learned trial Magistrate has dealt with the evidence in this case in exactly the same way as he would have dealt with evidence in a criminal matter thus assisting the defendants-appellants materially. Items of evidence which might have weighed the scales even more heavily against the appellants have been excluded from consideration by the Magistrate and even then he finds the facts’ in favour of respondent.</p><p>There is abundant evidence to justify the findings of fact by the learned trial Magistrate and the Divisional Court of Appeal. It is indeed difficult to imagine that any Court could have come to other conclusions.</p><p>It may be true that one of the principal witnesses for the respondent was an accomplice in this illegal transaction, but his evidence is corroborated in almost every particular if corroboration be needed by the surrounding circumstances and to some extent by evidence that is not in dispute. These circumstances have been carefully, concisely and fairly set out in the learned trial Magistrate’s judgment and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat them here.</p><p>The appeal is dismissed with costs assessed at £34 2s. 6d.</p><p>Appeal dismissed.</p>