DANIEL ISAAC UMODU V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Blackall, P. The appellant in this case appealed to the Supreme Court against a conviction for being in possession of a seditious publication.

At the opening of the appeal in the Court below, Counsel for the appellant asked that the appeal should be consolidated with three other appeals of the same character and that they be heard together. The Crown Counsel did not object and the Court agreed to this course being adopted. But subsequently the Law Officers, having in the meantime considered the matter more fully, came to the conclusion that this procedure was irregular, and the learned Crown Counsel who appeared on this appeal quite properly brought the point before the Court.

Mr. Taylor, for the appellant, was unable to cite any authority to show that criminal appeals may be consolidated, or any statutory provision in that behalf, but he asked that this Court should treat the procedure that was followed as a mere irregularity, we do not think we can. The power to consolidate civil actions derives from a provision in the Rules of Court (Order II. rule 7) which provides that causes or matters pending in the same Court may by order of the Court be consolidated. But Order I. rule 2, specifically stated that the Rules of Court shall apply only to civil causes except in so far as they may be applied to criminal causes by rules made under any Ordinance. There are no such rules about the consolidation of criminal proceedings; nor for that matter, are there any rules for the consolidation of civil appeals before this Court. It appears to us, therefore, that this is much more than an irregularity, as the procedure adopted offends against the fundamental principle that an accused person is to be tried upon the evidence adduced in the proceedings against him, and that alone. It may, as Mr. Taylor suggests, be more convenient for the appellant in this particular case, if in some way or other, this Court should adjudicate on the so-called appeal as it stands. But much wider issues are at stake, and we cannot open the door to a procedure which, as I have said, is contrary to a fundamental principle and would be fraught with great danger to accused persons.

In our judgment the hearing of the appeal in the Court below was a nullity. The parties are therefore in the same position as though that appeal had not yet been heard.

Proceedings in Supreme Court declared a nullity.