FRANKLIN AND OTHERS V. THE MINISTER OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING

Lord Thankerton

MY LORDS,

The Appellants, who are the owners and occupiers of dwelling-houses

and land situate at Stevenage, challenge the validity of the Stevenage New

Town (Designation) Order, 1946, made on the ninth November, 1946, by

the Respondent, under the New Towns Act, 1946, which had received the

Royal Assent on 1st August, 1946. This challenge is made under section 16

of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which provides by sub-

section i (b) that the Court, if satisfied that the order or any provision

therein is not within the powers of the Act or that the interests of the

applicant have been substantially prejudiced by any requirement of the

Act or of any regulation made thereunder not having been complied with,

may quash the order or any provision contained therein, either generally

or in so far as it affects any property of the applicant.

The relevant provisions of the New Towns Act, 1946, are as follows:

1.—(1) If the Minister is satisfied, after consultation with any

local authorities who appear to him to be concerned, that it is

expedient in the national interest that any area of land should be

developed as a new town by a corporation established under this

Act, he may make an order designating that area as the site of the

proposed new town.

(2) The provisions of the First Schedule to this Act shall have

effect with respect to the procedure to be followed in connection

with the making of orders under this section; and sections sixteen

and seventeen of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944 (which

relate respectively to the validity and date of operation of orders

under section one of that Act, and to the registration of such orders

in the register of local land charges) shall apply to an order made

under this section as they apply to an order made under section one

of that Act.

The relevant provisions of the First Schedule as to orders under section

one are as follows:

1. Where the Minister proposes to make an order under section

one of this Act, he shall prepare a draft of the order, describing

the area to be designated as the site of the proposed new town

by reference to a map, either with or without descriptive matter

(which, in the case of any discrepancy with the map, shall prevail

except in so far as may be otherwise provided by the draft order)

together with such statement as the Minister considers necessary

for indicating the size and general character of the proposed new

town.

2. Before making the order the Minister shall publish in the

London Gazette, in one or more newspapers circulating in the

locality in which the proposed new town will be situated, and in

such other newspapers, if any, as he considers appropriate in the

circumstances, a notice—

(a) describing the area to be designated as the site of the

proposed new town;

(b) stating that the draft of an order under section one of this

Act has been prepared by the Minister in relation thereto and

is about to be considered by him;

(c) naming a. place within the said area where a copy of the

draft order (including any map or descriptive matter annexed

thereto) and of the statement required by the foregoing para-

graph, may be seen at all reasonable hours) and

(d) specifying the time (not being less than twenty-eight

days from the publication of the notice in the Gazette) within

which, and the manner in which, objections to the proposed

order may be made,

and shall, not later than the date on which the notice is published

in the Gazette, serve a like notice on the council of the county and

of the county district in which the land, or any part of the land, to

which the order relates is situated, and on any other local authority

who appear to him to be concerned with the order.

3. If any objection is duly made to the proposed order and is

not withdrawn, the Minister shall, before making the order, cause

a public local inquiry to be held with respect thereto, and shall

consider the report of the person by whom the inquiry was held.

4. Subject to the provisions of the last foregoing paragraph the

Minister may make the order either in terms of the draft or subject

to such modifications as he thinks fit:

Provided that, except with the consent of all persons interested,

the Minister shall not make the order subject to a modification

including in the area designated as the site of the proposed new

town any land not so designated in the draft order.

Section 16 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, thus incorpo-

rated by section i (2) of the Act of 1946, restricts the remedy open to any

person desiring to challenge the validity of an order, or of any provision

therein, to the ground that it is not within the powers of the Act or that

some requirement of the Act has not been complied with, so that he must

proceed by application to the High Court, as therein provided, and he

requires to satisfy the Court that the order is not within the powers of

the Act, or that his interests have been substantially prejudiced by any

requirement of the Act not having been complied with.

On 3rd August. 1946, the Respondent prepared the Draft Stevenage New

Town (Designation) Order, 1946, and, on or about 6th August, 1946,

he caused the same to be published and notices to be given as prescribed

by paragraph 2 of the First Schedule to the Act of 1946. Thereafter objec-

tions were received from a number of persons, including the Appellants;

accordingly, the Respondent instructed Mr. Arnold Morris, an Inspector

of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, to hold a public local

inquiry, as prescribed by paragraph 3 of the said Schedule. Mr. Morris

held the inquiry at the Town Hall, Stevenage, on the 7th and 8th October,

1946, and on the 25th October made a report to the Respondent, in which

he set out a summary of the submissions made and the evidence given

by and on behalf of the objectors and attached thereto a complete tran-

script of the proceedings, which began with an opening statement by

Mr. Morris giving a brief recapitulation of the reasons that had led to

the designation of Stevenage as the site of a new town.

As already stated, on the nth November, 1946, the Respondent made

the Order, which is under challenge.

On the 9th December, 1946, the Appellants, by notice of motion, applied

to the High Court to have the Order quashed, on the following grounds:-

(1) That the said Order is not within the powers of the New

Towns Act, 1946, or alternatively that the requirements of the said

Act have not been complied with and the interests of the Applicants

have been thereby substantially prejudiced in that—

(A) before considering the objections of the Applicants the

Minister stated that he would make the said Order, and was

thereby biased in any consideration of the said objections;

and

(B) the Minister did not before making the said Order cause

a public local inquiry to be held with respect thereto; and

(2) that the New Towns Act, 1946, impliedly requires that the

objections of the Applicants should be fairly and properly con-

sidered by the Minister and that the Minister should give fair

and proper effect to the result of such consideration in deciding

whether the said Order should be made and that such implied

requirements were not complied with."

There does not appear to be much dispute as to the facts, but a great

deal rests on the proper inference to be drawn from these facts, which

may be stated chronologically as follows :

On 21st January, 1946, a committee appointed in 1945 by the Respon-

dent, as Minister of Town and Country Planning, and the Secretary of

State for Scotland, known as the " Reith Committee", made an interim

report, dated 21st January, 1946, and published as Command Paper 6759,

in which it is stated in paragraph 16,(1) Stevenage is suggested in the

Greater London Plan, 1944, as one of the new towns in the outer ring

round London. We are informed that the development of this town is a

matter of urgency, and that the agency must be chosen before legislation

can be obtained. (2) It is possible that by a special arrangement with the

Hertfordshire County Council, at the request of the Minister of Town

and Country Planning, the necessary land may be acquired for the

County Council under section 35 of the Town and Country Planning

Act, 1932, the Exchequer providing the necessary finance. We recom-

mend that there shall be an arrangement between the County Council

and a government sponsored corporation established by Royal Charter,

which will enable the latter to proceed in advance of legislation. (3) A

draft charter for this corporation, drawn up at our request by the

Treasury Solicitor, is in Appendix 4 (Note: Charters for corporations

established after legislation has been passed would derive from that

legislation and be different in content)." The committee recommended

in the ninth place, " Stevenage. Arrangements should be made for setting

up immediately a public corporation for the development of a new town

at Stevenage to proceed with the necessary work in advance of

legislation—paragraph 16."

The New Towns Bill was introduced by the Respondent in the House

of Commons on 17th April, 1946, and was ordered to be printed.

On or about 24th April, 1946, the Respondent sent letters to 179 owners

of land at Stevenage inquiring whether they were prepared to sell land

to the Respondent, with a view to the development of the area as a garden

city, as provided by section 35 of the Town and Country Planning Act,

1932. There is no evidence that any land was acquired by the Respondent

as the outcome of these letters, and we are entitled to assume that the

Minister was acting on the suggestion of the Reith Committee, and that

the proposal was superseded by the passage of the New Towns Act.

On 6th May, 1946, the Respondent attended and spoke at a public

meeting in Stevenage Town Hall, called to consider a proposal for desig-

nating an area of land in the neighbourhood of Stevenage as the site of

a new town. The Appellants base their case mainly on the statements

made in an advance Press notice issued by the Respondent prior to the

meeting, and statements made by the Respondent in the course of his

speech, as evidence that the Respondent had by that time completely

made up his mind that the designation of Stevenage as a new town would

be carried through, whatever was said at the meeting or subsequently.

Both the Press notice and the speech gave a somewhat detailed statement

of the development of the plans for relief of density of the population of

London by the formation of new towns, and the particular advantages

of the Stevenage area for such a purpose, but it is unnecessary to do more

than quote the passages founded on by the Appellants as demonstrating

the state of the Respondent's mind along with some of the immediate

context. All such passages in the Press notice are to be found in the

Respondent's speech, but the speech contains one short additional passage,

and the report of the speech also gives some of the interruptions of the

audience, and the reactions of the Respondent thereto, and records that

the Respondent, on rising to begin his speech, was greeted with cheers

from the platform and some booing from the hall. It seems that the

meeting might fairly be described as a lively one. The relevant passages

are as follows:

1. After review of the Abercrombie Plan for Greater London, the

interim reports of the Reith Committee, the unanimous approval given

to build the first new town at Stevenage, and the consideration of the

matter by the Government and inter-departmental committees, the

Respondent said,

I have now had the advantage of two interim reports—both

unanimous—from this Committee " (the Reith Committee),

and based upon these reports the Government has decided to

introduce legislation to facilitate the creation of these new

towns.

The New Towns Bill, published twelve days ago, will receive

its Second Reading on Wednesday, and I am here to-day—

(Voice: You are leaving it a bit late.)

In anticipation of the passage of the Bill—and I have no

doubt that it will go through—certain preliminary steps have

been taken regarding Stevenage by way of discussion with

local authorities concerned—(Voice: There has been no dis-

cussion with the Stevenage Local Authority)—and the prepara-

tion of a plan, and the giving of notices for the acquisition

of land under powers which I already have in pursuance of

the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932."

2. In reference to the choice of the Stevenage area,

I think you will agree that if we are to carry out our policy

of creating a number of new towns to relieve congestion in

London we could hardly have chosen for the site of one of

them a better place than Stevenage.

Now I know that many objections have been raised by the

inhabitants of Stevenage, perhaps not unnaturally."

3. Later the Respondent said, in two passages,

I want to carry out in Stevenage a daring exercise in town

planning—(Jeers). It is no good your jeering: it is going to

be done—(Applause and boos). (Cries of ' Dictator ')."

After all this new town is to be built in order to provide for

the happiness and welfare of some 60,000 men, women and

children."

For a number of years we in this country stood together and

suffered together, whilst fighting for an ideal, for a democracy

in which we believed. I am sure that this spirit is not dead

in Stevenage, and if you are satisfied that this project is worth

while, and for the benefit of large numbers of your fellow

human beings, you will be prepared to play your part to make

it a success.

The project will go forward because it must go forward. It

will do so more surely and more smoothly and more success-

fully with your help and co-operation. Stevenage will in a

short time become world famous—(Laughter). People from all

over the world will come to Stevenage to see how we here in

this country are building for the new way of life.

4. In answer to a question as to whether the rates would be increased

by the development, the Respondent said,

No, in due course Stevenage will gain. Local authorities

will be consulted all the way through. But we have a duty

to perform, and I am not going to be deterred from that duty.

While I will consult as far as possible all the local authorities,

at the end, if people become fractious and unreasonable I shall have to carry out my duty—(Voice: Gestapo !)."

The New Towns Bill received a Second Reading in the House of Commons on 8th May, 1946, and received the Royal Assent on 1st August,

1946. The statutory duty of carrying out the designation of new towns

thus became imposed on the Respondent as Minister of Town and Country

Planning.

Under paragraph 1 of the First Schedule to the Act, the Respondent

prepared, on 3rd August, 1946, a draft order for the designation of the

Stevenage area, and on or about 6th August, 1946, caused the Draft

Stevenage New Town (Designation) Order, 1946, to be published and

notices to be given as prescribed by paragraph 2 of the Schedule. As

already stated, objections were thereafter received, and on the instructions

of the Respondent, a public local inquiry was held by Mr. Morris on

7th and 8th October, 1946, and Mr. Morris made a report to the Respon-

dent on 25th October, 1946. It was conceded by the Appellants that there

was no evidence of any person having been deterred from lodging objec-

tions by any of the facts already stated, and there is no criticism of the

conduct of the inquiry by Mr. Morris except that which is involved in

the other contention of the Appellants as to the range of the inquiry, which

is claimed by them not to have been in compliance with the statutory

requirements. On the 8th November, 1946, the Respondent caused a

letter to be sent to the objectors, in which, after stating that he had

considered Mr. Morris's report, and that, after giving careful consideration

to the various submissions made to him on behalf of interested Local

Authorities and Statutory Undertakers and by private individuals affected

by the proposals, he had decided to make the Order, the Respondent, in

fourteen paragraphs, dealt in turn with the main objections raised. The

Appellants sought to maintain that, in paragraph 13, the Respondent

had not effectively dealt with the objections raised by the Metropolitan

Water Board, the Lee Conservancy Board and the Lee Conservancy

Catchment Board as to water supply and sewage disposal, which the

Appellants contended were vital to the practicability of the whole proposal,

but only stated that he had appointed a consultant to examine the possibili-

ties of a scheme which will apply to a much wider area than that of the

immediate vicinity of Stevenage. In my opinion this contention of the

Appellants was correctly disposed of by Lord Oaksey L.J., who pointed

out that none of these authorities had ever suggested that it was an entirely

impracticable scheme, and that it really raised a question of expense. The

Respondent said that these problems had been taken into account from

the beginning and had been the subject of discussions with the Ministry

of Health from an early stage and subsequently with the Metropolitan

Water Board and the Lee Conservancy Board. (The Appellants seek to

throw doubt on the statement as to discussion with these two Boards.)

The Respondent adds that he feels justified in going forward with the

establishment of a properly planned community and would maintain close

contact with the Ministry of Health and the Statutory Undertakers at

every stage of the development. From this it is clear that the Respondent,

after very long and full consideration of the matter, came to the conclusion

that these objections were in no degree fatal to the scheme, but were

matters to be examined and determined during the stage of development

of the new town, which comes after the making of the Order, when the

development corporation is established under section 2 of the Act. The

Appellants admit that, if the Respondent did so decide, his decision is not

open to challenge by them. It may further be observed that, during this

later stage, the Minister of Health, under section 9 of the Act, has the

power, on his own initiative, of constituting larger areas than the desig-

nated area for the purposes of public health. It appears to me that the

Respondent's letter of 8th November not only does not support the Appel-

lants' contention, but that it is evidence that the Minister had properly

considered the objections.

As already stated the Stevenage New Town (Designation) Order was

made by the Respondent in terms of paragraph 4 of the First Schedule

to the Act, and its validity is the subject of challenge in these proceedings.

Henn Collins J. upheld this first contention of the present Appellants

on the ground that the Respondent's functions in considering the report

of Mr. Morris's inquiry were quasi-judicial, that he did not consider the

objections with an open mind, and that " he did not consider or decide

the question Aye or No should the Order be confirmed with an open

mind, but that he meant to confirm it whatever the force of the objections

might be, trusting that some solution might be found. The learned Judge

based his view on the Respondent's speech of 6th May, 1946, and on

paragraph 13 of the Respondent's letter of 8th November. As regards

the former he says, "If I am to judge by what he said at the public

meeting which was held very shortly before the Bill, then published,

became an Act of Parliament, I could have no doubt but that any

issue raised by objectors was forejudged. The Minister's language

leaves no doubt about that. He was not only saying there must

and shall be satellite towns, but he was saying that Stevenage was to

be the first of them. But, when he made that speech, and gave his

answers to questions which were asked, he had no administrative functions in relation to the Act in question, for the Act had not then been passed. But though that was his attitude two days before the Bill received its Second Reading, it is upon the objectors

to prove that the Minister was in a like mind, or at least had not an open mind, from and after at latest the inception of the public inquiry, which was held in October.

As regards the letter of 8th November, 1946, the learned Judge says, " In this case, however, as was only to be expected of him, the Minister has dealt, in writing,

with the substance of the objections—with one exception, namely, that

directed to the difficulties of water supply and sewage disposal. It is

obvious that those difficulties must be met before the scheme can go

through. The Minister acknowledges that they have not been met, and

that he is taking advice as to how it can be done. Non constat that any

way will be found. And yet, with that fundamental problem still outstanding, the Minister confirms his Order How can it be said that he weighed the objection with an open mind when he acknowledges that he did not and does not know the force of it? When, therefore, I ask myself whether the objectors have satisfied me that from and after

the inception of the inquiry up to and including the moment at which the Minister decided to confirm his Order, he had not an open mind, my answer is that they have. It is clear that had the learned Judge appreciated, as was pointed out in the Court of Appeal, that no witness had suggested that the scheme could not go through, unless the suggested

difficulties of water supply and sewage disposal had been met, and had he realised that he had put a wrong construction on paragraph 13 of the letter of 8th November, 1946, he would not only have been left without any evidence that from and after the inception of the inquiry up to and including the confirmation of the Order the Respondent had not an open mind, but he would have had the evidence of the letter of 8th November, 1946,that the Respondent had so considered the report, and he should also have taken account of the unchallenged affidavit of the Respondent on 21st January, 1947, referred to by the Court of Appeal, that before causing the said Order to be made, I personally carefully considered all the objections made by the objectors including the present applicants, together with the submissions made and evidence given on their behalf as appearing in the said transcript. I also carefully considered the report of the said Arnold Morris." The learned Judge makes no reference to this affidavit. In that aspect of the evidence it appears that the learned Judge, in view of his reasoning, as above quoted, would not have quashed the Order.

The Court of Appeal accepted this view of the reasoning of the learned

Judge, and, while assuming that his inference from the Respondent's

speech of 6th May, 1946, that the Respondent had not then an open mind,

and that any issue raised by the objectors was forejudged was well-

founded, held that the learned Judge's statement of the evidence of the

objectors as to water supply and sewage disposal was incorrect, it not

having been suggested that the scheme was entirely unpracticable, and on

his erroneous construction of the letter of 8th November, 1946, set aside

the decision of Henn Collins J. and restored the Stevenage New Town

(Designation) Order of the present Respondent.

My Lords, I agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal, but I am

of opinion that an incorrect view of the law applicable in this case was

taken by the learned Judge, and I feel bound, despite the assumption of

its correctness by the Court of Appeal, to examine the correctness of the

learned Judge's view as to the proper inference from the Respondent's

speech of 6th May, 1946.

While the fact that the speech was made just before the second reading

of the Bill, and some months before the statutory duties as to designation

of new towns was imposed on the Respondent, has some bearing on the

fair construction of the speech, I am prepared to assume in favour of the

Appellants that, under the Bill as introduced, it was proposed to impose

these duties on the Respondent, as Minister of Town and Country Plan-

ning, and that these duties presented no material difference from those con-

tained in the Bill when passed into law. It could hardly be suggested

that, prior to its enactment, he was subject to any higher duty than is

to be found in the statute.

In my opinion, no judicial, or quasi-judicial, duty was imposed on the

Respondent, and any reference to judicial duty, or bias, is irrelevant in

the present case. The Respondent's duties under section 1 of the Act and

the First Schedule thereto are, in my opinion, purely administrative, but

the Act prescribes certain methods of, or steps in, discharge of that duty.

It is obvious that, before making the draft order, which must contain

a definite proposal to designate the area concerned as the site of a new

town, the Respondent must have made elaborate inquiry into the matter,

and have consulted any local authorities who appear to him to be con-

cerned, and obviously other departments of the Government, such as the

Ministry of Health, would naturally require to be consulted. It would

seem, accordingly, that the Respondent was required to satisfy himself

that it was a sound scheme before he took the serious step of issuing a

draft order. It seems clear also, that the purpose of inviting objections,

and, where they are not withdrawn, of having a public inquiry, to be

held by someone other than the Respondent, to whom that person reports,

was for the further information of the Respondent, in order to the final

consideration of the soundness of the scheme of the designation; and it

is important to note that the development of the site, after the Order is

made, is primarily the duty of the development corporation established

under section 2 of the Act. I am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid

on the Respondent in discharge of these statutory duties, and that the

only question is whether he has complied with the statutory directions to

appoint a person to hold the public inquiry, and to consider that person's

report. On this contention of the Appellants no suggestion is made that

the public inquiry was not properly conducted, nor is there any criticism

of the report by Mr. Morris. In such a case the only ground of challenge

must be either that the Respondent did not in fact consider the report

and the objections, of which there is here no evidence, or that his mind

was so foreclosed that he gave no genuine consideration to them, which

is the case made by the Appellants. Although I am unable to agree

exactly with the view of the Respondent's duty expressed by the learned

Judge, or with some of the expressions used by the Court of Appeal in

regard to that matter, it does appear to me that the issue was treated

in both courts as being whether the Respondent had genuinely considered

the objections and the report, as directed by the Act.

My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word " bias " should be

confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is

to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which

the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are

commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator.

The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two

or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent

mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the

dispute. As Lord Chancellor Cranworth says in Ranger v. Great Western

Railway Company, (1854) 5 H.L. 72, at p. 89, " A judge ought to be,

and is supposed to be, indifferent between the parties. He has, or is supposed to have, no bias inducing him to lean to the one side rather than to the other. In ordinary cases it is a just ground of exception to a judge that he is not indifferent, and the fact that he is himself a party, or interested as a party, affords the strongest proof that he cannot be indifferent." To this may be added the statement by Lord

Hewart C. J. in Rex v. Sussex Justices. McCarthy, Ex parte, (1924) I

K.B. 256, at p. 258, " It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when that

gentleman (the deputy clerk) retired in the usual way with the justices,

taking with him the notes of the evidence in case the justices might

desire to consult him, the justices came to a conclusion without con-

suiting him, and that he scrupulously abstained from referring to

the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line of cases shows

that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental import-

ance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and

undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question therefore is not whether

in this case the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any

criticism which he might not properly have made or offered; the question

is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspect as to be unfit

to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal matter. The answer to

that question depends not upon what actually was done but upon what

might appear to be done." This was followed in Rex v. Essex Justices.

Perkins, Ex parte, (1927) 2 K.B. 475. But, in the present case, the

Respondent having no judicial duty, the only question is what the Respon-

dent actually did, that is, whether in fact he did genuinely consider the

report and the objections.

Coming now to the inference of the learned Judge from the Respondent's

speech on 6th May that he had not then a mind open to conviction, the

learned Judge states it thus:—" If I am to judge by what he said at

the public meeting which was held very shortly before the Bill, then

published, became an Act of Parliament, I could have no doubt but

that any issue raised by objectors was forejudged. The Minister's

language leaves no doubt about that. He was not only saying there

must and shall be satellite towns, but he was saying that Stevenage was

to be the first of them. It seems probable that the learned Judge's

mind was influenced by his having already held that the Respondent's

function was quasi-judicial, which would raise the question of bias, but,

in any view, I am clearly of opinion that nothing said by the Respondent

was inconsistent with the discharge of his statutory duty, when subse-

quently objections were lodged, and the local public inquiry took place,

followed by the report of that inquiry, to genuinely consider the report

and the objections.

The only passages in the speech quoted in the Appellants' case are con-

tained in the third quotation I have made from the speech, and are as

follows: —

"I want to carry out in Stevenage a daring exercise in town planning

(Jeers). It is no good your jeering: it is going to be done . . . After all,

this new town is to be built in order to provide for the happiness and

welfare of some 60,000 men, women and children . . . The project

will go forward, because it must go forward- It will do so more

surely and more smoothly and more successfully with your help and

co-operation. Stevenage will in a short time become world famous.

People from all over the world will come to Stevenage to see how we

here in this country are building for the new way of life."

The only two additional passages founded on by the Appellants' coun

sel at the hearing before this House were the sentence in my first quotation,

In anticipation of the passage of the Bill—and I have no doubt that

it will go through," and, in my fourth quotation, "But we have a duty

to perform, and I am not going to be deterred from that duty. While

I will consult as far as possible all the local authorities, at the end,

if people become fractious and unreasonable I shall have to carry out

my duty—(Voice: Gestapo !) ".

My Lords, these passages in a speech, which was of a political nature,

and of the kind familiar in a speech on second reading, demonstrate

(1) the speaker's view that the Bill would become law, that Stevenage

was a most suitable site and should be the first scheme in the operation,

and that the Stevenage project would go forward, and (2) the speaker's

reaction to the hostile interruptions of a section of the audience. In my

opinion, these passages are not inconsistent with an intention to carry

out any statutory duty imposed on him by Parliament, although he

intended to press for the enactment of the Bill, and thereafter to carry

out the duties thereby involved, including the consideration of objections

which were neither fractious nor unreasonable.

I am therefore of opinion that the first contention of the Appellants

fails, in that they have not established either that in the Respondent's

speech he had forejudged any genuine consideration of the objections, or

that he had not genuinely considered the objections at the later stage when

they were submitted to him.

The remaining contention of the Appellants is that the inquiry held

by Mr. Morris did not comply with the statutory requirements for such

a local public inquiry, in respect that no evidence in support of the draft

order was led on behalf of the Respondent. This contention rests on

paragraph 3 of the First Schedule to the Act of 1946, read along with

section 19 (3) of the Act, which incorporates inter alia as to local inquiries

section 41 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which, in turn,

incorporates subsections (2) to (5) of section 290 of the Local Government

Act, 1933, which relate to the giving of evidence on, and defraying the

costs of, local inquiries. The terms of paragraph 3 of the First Schedule

to the Act of 1946, may conveniently be recalled,

3. If any objection is duly made to the proposed order and is not

withdrawn, the Minister shall, before making the order, cause a public

local inquiry to be held with respect thereto, and shall consider the report

of the person by whom the inquiry was held."

It has been held in both Courts below that the words with respect

thereto mean with respect to the objections , and the Appellants

did not challenge that construction in this House. In the only analogous

case of In re the Trunk Roads, Act. 1936, and the London-Portsmouth

Trunk Road (Surrey) Compulsory Purchase Order (No- 2) 1938, (1939)

2 K.B. 515, generally known as the Kingston Bypass case, it was held

that, under similar statutory provisions, other than the absence of the

words " in respect thereto ", it was not the duty of the Minister to call

evidence before the inquiry, but the duty of the objectors to state their

objections and call such evidence as they might be advised. While I find

no reason to doubt the correctness of that decision, which was admittedly

contrary to the present Appellants' contention, the words " in respect

thereto ", here present, definitely limit the scope of the inquiry, and

none of the general procedural provisions of section 290 of the Local

Government Act, 1933, can be held to extend its scope. As I have already

pointed out, the object of the inquiry is to further inform the mind of the

Minister, and not to consider any issue between the Minister and the

objectors; that is for the Minister thereafter to consider and decide.

Accordingly, I am of opinion that this contention of the Appellants also

fails.

In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of

the Court of Appeal should be affirmed. The Appellants should pay the

Respondent's costs of this Appeal.

Lord Thankerton

My Lords,

My noble and learned friends Lord Porter and Lord Uthwatt have

desired me to express their concurrence in the Opinion which I have just

delivered.

Lord du Parcq

My Lords,

I concur.

Lord Normand

My Lords,

I also concur.