<p>Verity, C.J. In this case the plaintiff-respondent claimed for herself and her children against the two defendants, as the Trustees of the Will of her late husband, an order to take possession of certain land alleged to form part of the residuary estate of the testator, and against the third defendant (the present appellant) for delivery of possession of the said land and an order for accounts of all rents and profits accrued therefrom since the death of the testator. The action was commenced in the Divisional Court of the Eastern Judicial Division of the Supreme Court and was tried in that Court before Dennison, Ag. J., who gave judgment in favour of the respondent. Against that judgment the third defendant alone has brought this appeal.</p><p>No objection ,vas taken in. the course of the proceedings in the Court below to the jurisdiction of that Court but the first ground of appeal is:-</p><p>“That the suit, was one relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land and was therefore within the competence and jurisdiction of the Land Court under section 6 of the Courts Amendment Ordinance No. 33 of 1944-and the Divisional Court which tried the suit had no jurisdiction, and its decision therefore a nullity.”</p><p>* Now rule 36 of the West African Court of Appeal Rules, 1950.</p><p>There were other grounds of appeal but this Court directed that argument should be addressed in the first instance by both parties to the question of jurisdiction.</p><p>I think it convenient to set out the relevant enactment inaccurately referred to in the grounds of appeal as “section 6 of the Courts Amendment Ordinance No. 33 of 1944”. The relevant section is section 2OA of the Courts Ordinance (Chapter 4) as enacted by section 6 of the Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance No. 33 of 1944) and as amended by section 3 of the Courts (Amendment No.2) Ordinance, 1945 (Ordinance No. 27 of 1945). The object of the amending Ordinances in this regard was to establish a Division of the Supreme Court vested with exclusive jurisdiction in what may briefly be described as “ land cases” , and the relevant provisions of section 20A as they now stand are as follows:-</p><p>“(1) There shall be a division of the Supreme Court to be known as the Lands Division, which shall exercise within such area as the Governor may from time to time by order specify, jurisdiction in all causes and matters relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of lands, specifically assigned to the Lands Division, by this or any other Ordinances. The Judges of the Lands Division to be known as Land judges, shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, the Chief Justice and so many Puisne Judges as the Chief Justice may from time to time assign to the Lands Division.”</p><p>“(3) The provisions of this or any other Ordinance relating to a Divisional Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction shall, unless the context other- wise requires, apply mutatis mutandis to the Land Court.</p><p>“(4) Subject to the provisions of section 18 of this Ordinance a Land Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land-“ in certain cases set out in this sub-section, including cases where there is no Native Court competent to try the cause or matter, which it appears to be agreed is so in regard to the present case, and, by paragraph (c):- “where, immediately prior to the appointed day, any such cause or matter is pending- “(iv) in the Supreme Court” in which case it is provided that the Land Court shall hear the cause de novo. This last provision is not directly applicable to the present proceedings, which were not pending immediately prior to the “appointed day”, but it is of interest and significance by reason of the emphasis it lays upon the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as constituted before this enactment and the Lands Division of the Supreme Court constituted thereby.</p><p>It is perhaps difficult to see wherein lies the practical distinction, more especially in such a case as the present in which no question of native customary law is involved and therefore there was no requirement for the attendance of assessors. The Land Judge is by section 20A (1) one of the Judges of the Supreme Court normally engaged in the trial of causes in a Divisional Court, and by virtue of section 20A (3) the powers and procedure in the Lands Division are those of a Divisional Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction. But it is clear from the provisions of paragraph (c) of section 20A (4) that, had this case been commenced in a Divisional Court before the day upon which the statute came into operation and had a Divisional Court Judge started the hearing before that day, nevertheless, the same Judge would not have been able to continue the hearing but would have had as a Land Judge to hear the cause de novo by express statutory requirement.</p><p>I have no doubt that the effect of the enactment, expressed in words free from all ambiguity, is that a case falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Land Court cannot be heard in a Divisional Court and, if. heard therein, the proceedings are a nullity, the Court having no jurisdiction.</p><p>The contrary view was not pressed by Counsel for the respondent, who based his argument rather upon the contention that the present case. is not a cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land” . Counsel based his argument upon the fact that in so far as the respondent claimed against the Trustees the action sought to put in motion the powers of the Supreme Court in the control of the conduct of Trustees, a matter which, it was submitted, would fall within the powers of the Chancery Division in England, or a Divisional Court in this country. Whatever may be the virtue of this argument, which would be more attractive were it not for the fact that by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 20A the Land Court can exercise all the powers of a Divisional Court, the contention is not applicable to the claim brought against the appellant which is nothing more or less than a claim against a person in wrongful pos- session for recovery of possession and an account of mesne profits, a claim which patently falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Court.</p><p>In my view, therefore, the appeal must succeed on this ground. It is, I think, most regrettable that the question of jurisdiction was not raised in the Court below. Although this Court is bound to entertain an objection on the ground of jurisdiction even though it be raised here for the first time in the course of the proceedings, yet it is most desirable that such an objection should be raised at the earliest possible moment in order that, if it be upheld, the parties shall be saved the time and expense of litigating in a Court which has not the jurisdiction to adjudicate. For this reason I would make no order as to costs, for had the appellant raised this question at an earlier stage the matter would doubtless have been rightly disposed of in the Court below and no appeal have been necessary .</p><p>The proceedings in the Court below being null it follows that the judgment therein .should be set aside, and this will affect not only the appellant but also the Trustees, even though they have not appealed. In spite of the argument of Counsel for the appellant I am of the opinion that the claim against the Trustees was of such a nature that where they are concerned also the action was a cause relating to the possession of land in which the Divisional Court had no. jurisdiction. By virtue of the W.A.C.A. Rules 1937 rule 32 * the order of this Court setting aside the judgment of the Court below as a nullity should apply to all parties to the suit including those who have not appealed.</p><p>I wish to add that I have reached this conclusion with the utmost reluctance and it is only because I am unable to give to the statute any other interpretation than appears inevitable from the clear and unambiguous words used by the legislature that I have felt’ impelled to uphold an objection which, while well founded in law, bears no relation whatever to any substantial ground upon which the appellant could feel aggrieved at the means whereby or the tribunal wherein the issues between the parties were adjudicated.</p><p>Wilson, C.J. I concur. Smith, J. I concur.</p><p>Appeal allowed.</p><p>* Now rule 36 of the West African Court of Appeal Rules, 1950.</p>