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REX V. EDEM UDO INYANG

JELR 81081 (WACA)

West Africa Court of Appeal  •   •  West Africa [For WACA cases]

🤖 BriefBot Summary

Coram
BAKER, AG. C.J. (NIGERIA), BROOKE, AG. S.P.J. (NIGERIA), AMES, J.

Appearances
Taylor for Appellant. Hay for the Crown.

Judgement
<p> The appellant was convicted of murder, and sentenced to death, in the Supreme Court of the Calabar Division. His defence was insanity.</p><p>This appeal is brought on the ground of misdirection by the learned trial Judge, when summing up the evidence as to the state of the accused’s mind at the time of committing the act and coming to the conclusion that the defence of insanity had not been established as defined in section 28 of the Criminal Code. Mr. J .1. C. Taylor was assigned to argue the appeal on behalf of the appellant, and his first submission of misdirection was that the defence was one of “ partial “ insanity (by which) he meant that the appellant was subject to periods of insanity, during one of which he killed the deceased) and that the judge took the defence to be one of “total insanity” (by which Mr. Taylor meant permanent insanity).</p><p>We do not agree with this submission. It is clear that the learned Judge’s summing up of the evidence was directed to ascertaining the state of mind of the appellant “when he struck the deceased” , no matter whether that state of mind was a temporary or permanent one.</p><p>Another submission of misdirection concerned that part of the judgment where the Judge referred to the statements made by the appellant on his being arrested and charged (there were two of these because he was arrested on charge of serious assault, and, after the death of the deceased later in the day. he was “ re-arrested “ on the following day and charged with murder) and to the statement made by him at the preliminary enquiry in the Magistrate’s Court; and another submission concerned that part of the judgment referring to the absence of motive.</p><p>Mr. Hay, for the Crown, argued inter alia that the Judge correctly directed himself when reviewing the evidence of insanity, and that in accordance with the decision of this Court in the case of Anuku (1) he was entitled to say that the facts taken as a whole satisfied him that at the time of the act the appellant was not insane. </p><p>Evidence of statements made by the appellant after the incident on being arrested and on the next day on being charged with murder were relevant to the enquiry into the state of his mind at the time of committing the act for which he was arrested, and so was the statement made to the Magistrate. </p><p>As to these the learned trial Judge said (after saying that at his trial the appellant said he had a “mental blackout” and could not remember what had happened). Before the, Magistrate, he made quite a coherent statement, “Exhibit 4, “and on arrest his mind was clear” as to having “killed or wounded someone” -Exhibit 3. These statements in Exhibit 3 he wrote himself.” </p><p>The learned Judge clearly regarded all these statements as indicative of sanity rather than insanity. </p><p>To refer to them in their chronological order (the nearer in time they are to the incident itself the more relevant they are); on his arrest for serious wounding of three people (as it appears to have been from the evidence of the Police . Constable who arrested him) he said in the statement which he wrote: “I have j wounded some people. They are now in the hospital I have wounded one Udo Ude ., .I wounded only Udo Ude , ..I don’t know anything about other wounded persons.” It did not transpire at the trial who were the three persons he was alleged to have wounded, except of course that the deceased (who was a woman) was one of them, Udo Ude may have been another. The statement (short as it is) starts off in one way but ends in the opposite one.</p><p>The next day, the deceased having died in the meantime, he was charged with her murder. He then wrote . While I was on active duty I saw Udo Ude who came and stole away my wife, Ekpo Nka Cwo, I did not kill him but I wounded ? him and he is now in the hospital,” He signed that adding the date and 8 am,” J He thereafter wrote on the same bit of paper: While I was in my house and on “active service I saw somebody at my door, and I drove them away with a stick and killed two with a matchet. They came for the sole purpose of committing adultery with my wife Mrs. A. E. U, Inyang,” This was also signed and dated, and timed “8.15 a.m.” It is not clear what he meant by being on active duty” or on active service “. If he meant to refer to his employment, it was incorrect’ because that had been terminated before he killed the deceased. If the statement was meant to refer to the charge of murder of the deceased (as one must suppose it to have been meant) it is surprising because there is no mention of Udo Ude in the evidence, nor of the appellant’s having “killed” (he may mean wounded or attacked) two people.”</p><p>The statement before the Magistrate was made twenty-five days later, It is very much longer and much more detailed, and the details are much the same as the evidence about them.</p><p>With all respect we think that the learned Judge misdirected himself as to the inference to be drawn from the statements made on the day of his arrest (and very soon after it) and on the next day. </p><p>There was no motive for the crime, As to this the learned Judge said: “Absence of motive is not evidence of insanity: Rex v. Haynes: Archbold (31st Edition) page 16,” In our opinion this is not quite correct. Absence of motive by itself would not be: or as Archbold puts it, in the passage to which the Judge referred: Mere absence of any evidences of motive for a crime is not a sufficient ground upon which to infer mania.” When there is as much evidence indicative of insanity rather than the opposite as there was in this case, the absence of any evidence of motive may become relevant to the point at issue, and material to it. </p><p>Whether the appellant was insane in the legal sense at the time the act was committed is a question of fact triable by the jury and is dependent upon the previous and contempoaneou acts of the party. Evidence of insanity of ancestors or blood relations is admissible, R. v. Tuchet (2), R. v. Vyse (3). Medical evidence is not essential.</p><p>Now what is the history of the appellant? One witness Francis Ekpanyong Idio who came from the same village as the appellant and has known him from I his birth, deposed that at the age of twenty the appellant developed pains in the head and said he felt his head was bursting and received medical treatment and that from then onwards he periodically suffered from the said pains and received treatment.</p><p>This witness goes on to say” of my knowledge he was not right in the head. His mother suffered from similar pains in the head and his father had no proper control over his mental powers. He (the appellant) had “a wandering disposition” he would “ lock the house and wander about at night. Sometimes he would leave on a cycle and come back later with a dirty tin leaving the cycle by the wayside and that when he was in this condition his eyes grew red” .</p><p>The accused’s wife gave evidence and stated” he was given at times to insane laughter, at other times he would throw his food away, sometimes he would proceed to school with shoe and hose on one foot and nothing on the other”. Appellant’s uncle deposed that appellant used to speak in a meaningless manner and do things no sane man would do.</p><p>The warder in charge of lunatics also deposed that whilst appellant was in his charge” when food was passed to him he urinated into it, and stirred it up with his finger” . This witness also said he did not consider him normal. Acts contemporaneous with the crime we have already set out.</p><p> The doctor who saw the appellant after the murder stated he could not see signs of mental deficiency. This witness, however: never saw the appellant. prior I to the trial and therefore could not form an opinion as to whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting contrary to law. For the above reasons we are of opinion that the trial Judge did not direct himself correctly on the question of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime and accordingly quash the sentence and substitute a special verdict of guilty but insane and order the appellant to be kept in custody as a criminal lunatic until the Governor’s pleasure be known.</p><p>Appeal allowed and verdict of guilty but insane substituted.</p>

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