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Foster-Sutton, P. .The appellants were charged with, and convicted of, publishing a seditious publication in a newspaper called The Daily Service, contrary to section 51 (1) (c) of the Criminal Code.
At the trial before Johnston, J.. the appellants attempted to lead evidence in endeavour to show that the allegations contained in the publication complained of were true.
The learned trial Judge held that if every allegation contained in the publication were proved by the defence to be true, such proof would not entitle the defendants to an acquittal, and he ruled the evidence inadmissible.
Counsel for the appellants submitted that before an accused person can avail himself of the protection afforded by paragraphs (i) to (iv) of section 50 (2) of the Ordinance he must prove the truth of the allegations contained in a publication complained of otherwise he cannot establish the bona fides of his intention.
Section 50 (1) of the Ordinance defines a “seditious publication “ as meaning a publication having a seditious intention and a “seditious intention “is defined in paragraphs (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of the section.
There can, in our view be no doubt as to the correctness of the ruling made the learned trial Judge.
The gist of the offence is in the intent to do one or more of the matters stated in the definition of seditious intention independently of the truth or otherwise of the matters alleged in the publication complained of, and in our opinion the intention is to be ascertained by reference to the contents of the publication.
Sub-section (3) of section 50 of the Ordinance expressly provides that in determining whether the intention with which any document was published was or was not seditious, “every person shall be deemed to intend the consequences which would naturally follow from his conduct at the time and under the circumstances in which he so conducted himself”. In this case the appellants’ conduct in publishing the article and cartoon referred to in the complaint.
As was pointed out by Viscount Caldecote, L.C.. in Rex v. Wallace-Johnson (1), fine distinctions may sometimes have to be drawn between facts which justify the conclusion that the intention of the person charged was seditious and facts which are consistent only with the view that the intention was no more than one those enumerated in paragraphs (i) to (iv) of sub-section (2) of section 50, but this is not one of those cases.
If the publication is seditious by reason of its expression of a seditious intention as defined in section 50 of the Ordinance, as was clearly the case here, then the offence has been committed and no extrinsic evidence is relevant to prove intention.
For these reasons we dismissed this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.